We establish a natural translation from word rewriting systems to strictly positive polymodal logics. Thereby, the latter can be considered as a generalization of the former. As a corollary we obtain examples of undecidable strictly positive normal modal logics. The translation has its counterpart on the level of proofs: we formulate a natural deep inference proof system for strictly positive logics generalizing derivations in word rewriting systems. We also formulate some open questions related to the theory of modal companions of superintuitionistic logics that was initiated by L.L. Maksimova and V.V. Rybakov.
In this note we study the fragment of polymodal logic consisting of implications of the form A → B, where A and B are formulas built-up from ⊤ and propositional variables using just ∧ and the diamond modalities. We call such formulas A and B strictly positive and will often omit the word 'strictly. ' The interest towards such weak logics independently emerged within two different disciplines: provability logic and description logic (see [8, 5, 1] ). In both cases, it was observed that the strictly positive language combines simplicity and efficiency while retaining a substantial amount of expressive power of modal logic. Thus, strictly positive fragments of many standard modal logics are polytime decidable. The positive fragment of the (Kripke incomplete) polymodal provability logic GLP is both polytime decidable and complete w.r.t. a natural class of finite Kripke frames [5] . The positive variable-free fragment of this logic gives rise to a natural ordinal notation system up to the ordinal ε 0 and allows for a proof-theoretic analysis of Peano arithmetic [1] .
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Strictly positive logics
Consider a modal language L Σ with propositional variables p, q,. . . , a constant ⊤, conjunction ∧, and a possibly infinite set of symbols Σ = {a i : i ∈ I} understood as diamond modalities. The family Σ is called the signature of the language L Σ . Strictly positive formulas (or simply formulas) are built up by the grammar:
Sequents are expressions of the form A ⊢ B where A, B are strictly positive formulas. We present two types of calculi for strictly positive logics: sequentstyle and deep inference-style. Sequent-style systems for several positive logics have been introduced and studied in [1, 2] . This was preceded by an equational logic characterizations of the same logics in [5] .
Basic sequent-style system, denoted K + , is given by the following axioms and rules:
It has not been explicitly mentioned but easily follows from the techniques of [5, 2] that K + axiomatizes the strictly positive fragment of the polymodal version of basic modal logic K, so we state this result witout proof.
If one wishes, one can adjoin some further axioms to K + , which correspond to some standard modal logics.
Let K4
+ denote the logic axiomatized over K + by Axiom (4); S4 + is axiomatized over K + by (4) and (T ); S5 + is S4 + together with (5). If L is a logic, we write A ⊢ L B for the statement that the sequent A ⊢ B is provable in L.
The following theorem is obtained by Dashkov [5] (the case K4 + ) and by Dashkov and Svyatlovsky (the cases S4 + and S5 + ), see [11] . The latter paper also gives an infinite though explicit axiomatization of the strictly positive fragment of the logic K4.3.
Theorem 2 Let L be any of the logics K4, S4, S5.
Let C[A/p] denote the result of replacing in C all occurrences of a variable p by A. If a logic L contains K + then ⊢ L satisfies the following positive replacement lemma.
Proof. Induction on the build-up of C. ✷ A positive logic L is called normal if it contains K + and is closed under the following substitution rule:
It is clear that all the positive logics considered so far are normal.
Modal companions of strictly positive logics
The language of modal logic is obtained from L Σ by adding boolean connectives. Recall that a modal logic is called normal if it contains basic modal logic K and is closed under the rules modus ponens, necessitation and substitution.
There is a natural functor associating with each normal modal logic L its strictly positive fragment P(L) consisting of all sequents A ⊢ B with A, B strictly positive such that L ⊢ (A → B). Vice versa, to each strictly positive normal logic P we can associate its modal counterpart M(P ) axiomatized over K by all the implications A → B such that A ⊢ P B.
We note that both functors preserve inclusion, that is, are monotone. The following obvious lemma states that M and P, in fact, form a Galois connection.
Lemma 2.1 For any normal modal logic L and any strictly positive normal logic P ,
As a standard consequence we obtain that the composite operations MP and PM are monotone and idempotent on the corresponding classes of logics. Moreover,
The converse inclusions in (i) and (ii), generally, do not hold. For (i) we can refer to the results of Dashkov [5] . He has shown that for the standard modal logic GL of Gödel and Löb we have P(GL) = K4 + . However, by Theorem 2, M(K4 + ) = K4 = GL. For (ii), let Σ = {✸} and consider the logic P obtained from K + by adding the schema ✸A ⊢ A. We claim that
On the other hand, p∧✸⊤ P ✸p. Consider a Kripke model (W, R, v) where W = {0, 1} and the only R-related elements are 0R1. We also let v(p) = {0}, and all the other variables are assumed to be false. For every positive formula A, the set of all the nodes of W where A is true is downward closed. Hence, it is easy to see that this model is sound for P . However W, 0 p ∧ ✸⊤ → ✸p.
It has to be noted that strictly positive logics not representable as strictly positive fragments of modal logics naturally occur in the study of reflection principles in arithmetic. For example, the system RCω axiomatizing the properties of uniform reflection principles over Peano arithmetic is of this kind [2] .
A modal logic L such that P(L) = P is called a modal companion of a positive logic P . As we have seen, not every normal positive logic P has a companion. If it does, then M(P ) is the least modal companion of P in the sense that M(P ) is contained in any other companion of P . The set of modal companions of P , if it is not empty, also has maximal elements. This statement immediately follows from Zorn's lemma noting that the union of a chain of modal companions of P is also its modal companion.
The notion of modal companion of a strictly positive logic is parallel to the one of superintuitionistic logic. The systematic study of maximal and minimal modal companions of superintuitionistic logics was initiated by Maksimova and Rybakov [9] and followed by several important results including the Blok-Esakia theorem (see [3, 7] and also [12] for a recent survey). For normal strictly positive logics many natural questions regarding modal companions present themselves, however so far this interesting area has not been really explored. We mention some such questions here, all of which have well-known answers in the case of superintuitionistic logics. Problem 1. Find useful criteria for a normal strictly positive logic P to have a modal companion. Equivalently, for which strictly positive logics P do we have P(M(P )) = P ? Problem 2. Are there normal strictly positive logics P , for which there is no greatest modal companion? Are K + and K4 + such logics?
Problem 3. Is GL a maximal modal companion of K4 + ? In fact, except for the cases where maximal and minimal modal companions coincide, we do not know any specific examples of maximal modal companions.
Let us also note that modal logics L representable as the least modal companions of strictly positive logics are exactly those axiomatized over K by a set of strictly positive implications. Hence, if L = M(P ), as a consequence of Lemma 2.1 we have
Strictly positive implications are Sahlqvist formulas, therefore such logics enjoy the nice properties ensured by Sahlqvist theorem, that is, their completeness with respect to an elementary class of frames and canonicity.
Hence, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3 If L = M(P ), then both P and L are complete w.r.t. an elementary class of frames. Moreover, they both are valid in the canonical frame for L.
Obviously, an arbitrary normal strictly positive logic P need not even be Kripke complete.
Strictly positive deep inference calculus
It is natural to axiomatize the consequence relation on L Σ in such a way that the derived objects are positive formulas and A ⊢ B is understood as provability of B from hypothesis A.
We postulate the following conjunction introduction and elimination rules:
The rule for ⊤ is just A ⊤
Notice that all the rules have one premiss. Rules in deep inference calculi are applied within a context. A context is a strictly positive formula C(p) in which a variable p occurs only once. Let A B be a rule instance. For any context C(p), we say that C(B) is obtained from C(A) by a rule application. A derivation is a sequence of formulas in which every member, except for the first one, is obtained from the previous one by a rule application.
Let L be a normal positive logic given by a set S of sequents (schemata) over K + . We can naturally associate with L its deep inference version L D where, in addition to the above mentioned rules for ∧ and ⊤, for every axiom-sequent
Proof. Obvious induction on the length of the derivation A ⊢ L D B using the fact that if C 1 (p), C 2 (p) are contexts then so is
Proof. For the (⇒) we note that the syllogism rule corresponds to the composition of derivations. The conjunction elimination axioms match the corresponding rules.
To treat the conjunction introduction rule assume C ⊢ L A and C ⊢ L B. By the IH we have L D derivations of A from C and of B from C. Lemma 3.1 yields derivations of A ∧ C from C ∧ C and of A ∧ B from A ∧ C. Hence, we can derive in L D : C, C ∧ C, . . . , A ∧ C, . . . , A ∧ B, as required.
The modal rule is also interpreted by putting a deep inference proof within a context. If there is an L D proof of B from A, then by Lemma 3.1 there is a proof of aB from aA. ✷ Notice that this yields deep inference systems for K + , K4 + , S4 + and S5 + .
Word rewriting systems
A word rewriting system over an alphabet Σ is given by a set of rules of the form A → B where A, B are words in Σ. Such systems are also known as semi-Thue systems (see [6, Chapter 7] ). A rule application is a substitution of an occurrence of A in any word by B:
A derivation in a system R is a sequence of words in which every member is obtained from the previous one by an application of one of the rules of R. We write A ։ R B iff there is a derivation of B from A in R (the subscript R is omitted if understood from the context). It is well-known that finite word rewriting systems (over a finite alphabet Σ) are a universal model of computation. In particular, there is a finite system R such that it is undecidable whether a given word B is derivable from a given word A.
To each word rewriting system R over Σ we associate a normal strictly positive logic L R in L Σ . L R is obtained from K + by adding the axioms Ap ⊢ Bp, for each of the rules A → B from R. The words A and B are now understood as sequences of modalities.
Proof. (only if) We argue by induction on the length of an R-derivation x of B from A. Basis is easy. Suppose x has the form:
where U → V is a rule from R.
The (if) part is based on the following two lemmas. Proof. By Lemma 4.1 we may assume that the ⊤-rule is not applied in the given derivation. We argue by induction on the number of conjunction introduction rule applications in the given derivation d. Since the ⊤-rule is not applied in d, every conjunction occurrence disappears as a result of conjunction elimination rule application either to itself, or to an external conjunction. Every formula containing at least one conjunction has the form γ(C 1 ∧ C 2 ) where γ ∈ Σ * (and the displayed conjunction is the outermost one).
In all the formulas of the derivation consider the outermost conjunction. Notice that at least one outermost conjunction must be introduced in the derivation (e.g., such is the conjunction introduced first). We select the chronologically last introduced outermost conjunction. We notice that no conjunction is introduced outside this one before it is eliminated. Otherwise, the first such application would introduce an outermost conjunction later than the selected one. Hence, the selected conjunction has exactly one successor in each step of the derivation until it disappears as a result of conjunction elimination applied to itself:
Notice that the R-rules do not apply to conjunctions, and the conjunction rules can only be applied inside the selected conjunction. Therefore, there exist separate derivations of δ(q) from γ(q), and of each C j (j ∈ {1, 2}) from C, respectively. It follows that we can replace this subderivation by γC, . . . , δC, . . . , δC i , thus eliminating at least one application of conjunction introduction rule in the whole derivation. ✷
To complete the proof of Theorem 5 we notice that a deep inference format L R -derivation of Bp from Ap in which no ⊤-rule and conjunction rules are applied is essentially an R-derivation of B from A. The only applicable rules are the R-rules whose effect is exactly that of R-substitutions. ✷ It has to be noted that the finitely axiomatized strictly positive logics that have naturally occurred so far all are polytime decidable (see [5, 2] ).
The results of the last section of this paper have a very close predecessor in the work of Valentin Shehtman and Alexander Chagrov (see [10, 4] ). In particular, Chagrov and Shehtman exhibit undecidable propositional polymodal logics whose axioms are given by the implications of the form A → B, where A and B are sequences of ✷-modalities. Clearly, such logics are the minimal modal companions of the positive logics we considered in this section. The authors, however, use semantical rather than syntactical arguments to establish a correspondence of their logics with the (semi-)Thue systems. In a sense, the correspondence between strictly positive logics of the considered kind and semiThue systems is even closer than for modal logics, for it extends to the level of derivations.
We thank anonymous referees for spotting some errors in the previous version of the paper and Valentin Shehtman for pointing out a connection with his work.
